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Abstract 
Understanding factors that can enhance a firm‟s innovativeness is of critical 
concern in management research. Prior studies in strategy and financial economics have 
advanced our understanding of how resource allocation into innovation is shaped in a 
firm, mainly from the perspectives of ownership and financial structures. However, the 
extant literature is incomplete, because it treats ownership and financial structures as 
separate determinants, even though theoretical arguments and empirical evidences 
suggest that they are interdependent. This study investigates the determinants of firm‟s 
R&D investments by bridging ownership and financial structures. Ownerships held by 
inside and external owners are considered for ownership structure, while financial slack 
and leverage ratio are considered for financial structures.  
Exploiting simultaneous equation modeling technique and data sample of Korean 
firms, I found the direct and indirect effects of different types of ownership on R&D 
investments. Different from previous studies, this paper showed that financial factors 
such as financial slack and leverage ratio that were used to be considered as determinants 
of R&D  investments are just mediators  through which ownership structure affects firm‟s 
strategic decision indirectly.   
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The importance of R&D investment has received increasing attentions from 
policy-makers and researchers in the fields of economics and strategic management, since 
a lot of empirical evidence have showed that investment in R&D has a significant 
positive effect on economic growth. The proponents of new growth theory such as Romer 
(1990), Lucas (1988) all realized the contribution of R&D activities in pushing economic 
growth. In the OECD report written by Guellec and Van-Pottelsberghe (2001), they 
found that one percent increase in R&D stock would contribute 0.13 percent increase in 
the growth of multi-factor productivity. These studies emphasized the importance of 
R&D investments in contributing to country‟s economic growth and enhancing 
comprehensive national power from the macro level.  
As the importance of R&D stock to a country, appropriate expenditure on R&D 
investments is also essential for firm‟s survival and growth, especially for firms in R&D-
intensive industry. This paper tries to investigate the determinants of R&D investments 
from micro level, namely from firm‟s specific characteristics. As Franko (1989) pointed 
out, firms especially in technologically industries rely on R&D investments to guarantee 
firm‟s viability and generate sustained competitive advantages. However, firms differ in 
committing their resources to R&D investments even after controlling for the industry, 
firm size and performance (Ettlie, 1998; Mosakowski, 1993). Rumelt et al. (1994) 
claimed that the presence of heterogeneity in R&D expenditures on the firm-level is still 
the fundamental research in the area of strategic management, because understanding the 
differences in firm‟s R&D investments may help us explain the existence of 
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heterogeneity in other dimensions, for example, firm performance and absorptive 
capability.  
Reviewing the literature, we can find two research streams on the determinants of 
R&D investments. The first stream concerns about the influence of ownership structure, 
which is mainly based on agency theory. For example, Lee and O‟Neill (2003) 
investigated the different effects of ownership concentration on firm‟s R&D intensity in 
US and Japanese contexts. The second research line focuses on the role financial 
structures such as financial slack and debt conditions. Researches done in this stream are 
mainly based on behavioral search theory, pecking order theory, signaling, and agency 
theory. For instance, Long and Ravenscraf (1993) studied the impact of leverage ratio on 
R&D intensity for firms undergoing a leveraged buyout. However, most of previous 
studies treated ownership and financial structures as separate determinants, even though 
theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggest that they are interdependent.  
Therefore, the extant literature ignores the potential interplay of ownership 
structures and financial structures in decisions where R&D investments are determined. I 
argue that this void may lead to a serious limitation in understanding firms‟ R&D 
investments, because the current division of the literature may give incomplete 
understanding of what are the relationships between the antecedents of R&D investments 
(due to missing some relationship between ownership structures and financial structures 
such as mediation relationships) and what are the consequences of the relationships 
between those antecedents on R&D investments (such as over-investments etc.). 
Therefore, identifying the direct and indirect effects of the salient factors of R&D 
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investments in a simultaneous model will help us to reveal new insights on the 
relationship as well as avoid any false attribution of causality between those structure 
factors and R&D investments. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a systematic view on the determinants of R&D 
investments on firm level, which has important implications in explaining firm‟s superior 
performance and competitive advantages. Therefore, the main research questions of this 
paper are: What are the determinants of R&D investments? What are the influences of 
controlling owners and institutional owners in emerging markets? Are financial structures 
such as financial slack and leverage ratio mediating factors in affecting R&D investments? 
This paper contributes to the literature as follows: 1) it extends our understanding 
of how ownership structure shapes strategic decisions such as R&D investments in 
emerging markets. Since La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessons et al. (2000)‟s finding that 
there is little separation between control and ownership in emerging markets all around 
the world, many studies have been done to discern the role of controlling owners. 
However, whether these controlling owners are long-term oriented and promote R&D 
investments are still not clear. What‟s more, the drastic debate regarding the effect of 
institutional investors on firms‟ R&D investments are most based on US governance 
mechanism. I argue that different governance mechanisms and environment such as legal 
protection may change their orientations. This paper enriches our understanding of their 
roles in emerging markets. 2) It fills the literature void by bridging the relationships 
between ownership structure and financial structure, which was neglected by previous 
researchers. Kim et al. (2008) argued that ownership structure has moderating effect on 
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the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments. However, this paper 
views financial structures such as financial slack and leverage ratio as mediating factors. 
And my empirical study showed support for this perspective. 3) It verifies some 
conventional wisdom such as the role of leverage ratio on R&D investments in Korean 
context. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I reviewed the 
literature regarding the roles of ownership structure such as controlling ownership and 
institutional ownership and financial structures such as financial slack and leverage ratio 
in determining firm‟s R&D investments, and reviewed the potential links between 
ownership structure and financial structure. In Chapter 3, I proposed the main hypotheses 
about the relationship between the antecedents of R&D investments and their influences 
on R&D investments. In Chapter 4, I did the empirical test and presented the results. 
Finally, I concluded with implications and pointed out the directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since this paper aims to investigate the relationships between the antecedents of 
R&D investments and their impacts on R&D investments, in the following parts I will 
review the literature regarding these constructs such as R&D investments, ownership 
structure and their relationships. First, some aspects of R&D investments such as its 
importance, characteristics, determinants and its contribution to firm‟s value are 
introduced in detail. According to the literature, there are two main determinants of R&D 
investments that are wildly identified by previous scholars, namely ownership structure 
and financial structure. Thus, previous studies about ownership structure and financial 
structure are reviewed respectively. Finally, this paper provides a short summary of this 
literature review part. 
2.1 R&D investments 
R&D is the abbreviation of research and development. R&D activity refers to 
"creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of 
knowledge to devise new applications" (OECD, 2008), includes fundamental research, 
applied research and development test. The scale of R&D activities or R&D intensity 
constitutes an important criterion to measure the scientific and technological strength or 
core competency of a country. Similarly, the scale of R&D activities untaken by a firm 
represents its value and competitiveness. Almost all famous international companies view 
R&D activities as the blood of a firm and invest lots of resources in R&D activities. In 
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the following paragraphs, this paper will talk about the importance of R&D investments, 
the characteristics of R&D investments, determinants and its contribution to firm‟s value.  
2.1.1 The importance of R&D investments  
The importance of R&D has received increasing attentions from policy-makers 
and researchers in the fields of economics and strategic management, since a lot of 
empirical evidences have showed that investment in R&D has a significant positive effect 
on economic growth (Bettina and Nigel, 2008). From the macro level, the proponents of 
new growth theory such as Romer (1990), Lucas (1988) all realized the contribution of 
R&D activities in pushing economic growth. In the OECD report written by Guellec and 
Van-Pottelsberghe (2001), they found that one percent increase in R&D stock would 
contribute 0.13 percent increase in the growth of multi-factor productivity. From the 
micro level, firm faces more competitions as the economies globalized. The appropriate 
expenditure spends on R&D activities is very important for firm‟s survival and growth, 
especially for the technology intensive industry such as IT industry (Chan et al., 1990). 
These R&D activities are mainly the sources of innovativeness and help firm generate 
sustained competitive advantages (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Franko, 1989; Hall, 1998). 
However, firms differ in committing their resources to R&D investments even after 
controlling for the industry, firm size and performance (Ettlie, 1998; Mosakowski, 1993).  
Since strategy literature shifted away from industry structure and towards firm 
heterogeneity, theories such as resource-based view are developed to explain firm 
heterogeneity. Rumelt et al. (1994) claimed that the presence of heterogeneity in R&D 
expenditures on the firm-level is still the fundamental research in the area of strategic 
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management, because understanding the differences in firm‟s R&D investments may help 
us explain the existence of heterogeneity in other dimensions, for example, firm 
performance and core capability. 
2.1.2 The characteristics of R&D investments  
R&D investment is one kind of special investments that its result is usually 
unknown. Mezghanni (2009) concluded that R&D investment has the following three 
characteristics: high asset specificity, long investment horizon and high failure rate. High 
asset specificity means that the outputs of R&D activities are specialized and can only be 
fully deployed in its only firm (Williamson, 1988).  If such kind of asset is transferred to 
another firm, it will lose value to some extent. In order to get innovative technologies in 
some area, firms need to input a lot of human and financial resources continuously, which 
means long investment horizon. High failure rate refers to the high uncertainty of R&D 
activities, means that the expenditure in R&D investments may not get any return or may 
get some return only after many years. Because of these characteristics of R&D activities, 
financing for them is different from other kind of investments (Bah and Dumontier, 2001; 
Singh and Faircloth, 2005).  
2.1.3 R&D investments and firm value 
It is commonly shared by the literature that R&D investments are crucial to the 
technology intensive firms and ensure their sustainability and competitiveness 
(Mezghanni, 2009). Hence, it is expected that R&D investments should help improve 
firm performance. Early empirical studies investigated the relationship between R&D 
investments and firm value with two approaches. First approach studied the market 
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reaction about announcements of changes in R&D spending. For example, Jarrell et al. 
(1985) reported a positive impact of announcements that firms were starting new R&D 
projects; Woolridge (1988) studied the market response to the announcements of long-
term investments including R&D projects, and got the same conclusion with Jarrell et al. 
(1985).  
The other approach investigated the relationship between R&D investments and 
firm value. Ben-Zion (1984) found that R&D intensity has a positive effect on firm‟s 
market value. Using a panel of British manufacturing firms, Blundell et al. (1999) 
reported a robust and positive relationship between the headcounts of innovation and 
market value. Connolly and Hirschey (1984) found the positive effect of R&D 
investments on Tobin‟s Q. Using a sample of Australian firms, Chan et al. (2007) found 
that higher R&D intensity is associated with better firm value regardless of the 
accounting methods used. Above abundant of empirical studies confirmed our 
conventional wisdom that it is worth investing in R&D activities. 
2.1.4 The determinants of R&D investments 
According to the upper-echelons perspective, firms‟ actions are reflections of 
their top management teams (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, decisions about the 
magnitude and allocation of R&D investments are at the discretion of top management 
team. Thus, the amount of expenditure on R&D activities depends on managers‟ risk 
aversion and preferences. Exploiting the resource-based view, it is obvious that the 
resources a firm possesses will determine the type of strategies it will take. What‟s more, 
managers‟ decisions and behavior are monitored by various types of shareholders (Jensen 
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and Meckling, 1976). Hence, while shareholders may affect firms‟ R&D investment 
decisions through monitoring managers, resources such as internal finance constraint 
firms from investing more in R&D activities. 
Based on above logic, we can divide literature about the determinants of R&D 
investments into two streams. The first stream focuses on the role financial structures 
such as financial slack and debt conditions. Researches done in this stream are mainly 
based on behavioral search theory, pecking order theory, signaling, and agency theory. 
The second stream concentrates on the influence of ownership structure. Because 
different types of owners have different preferences, investment horizons and monitoring 
power (Hoskisson et al., 2002), they may have different influences on firm‟s strategic 
decisions such R&D investments. Researches that have been done in this stream mostly 
draw on agency theory. This paper will review the determinants of R&D investments 
according to these two streams. 
2.2 Ownership structure 
As Williamson (1963) suggested, ownership structure is the basis of corporate 
governance. Abundant studies have been done on the effects of ownership structure on 
firm performance, capital structure, innovation and diversification strategy and other 
aspects. Thus, the research studying about the effects of ownership structure on R&D 
investments becomes one main area. Since controlling ownership and institutional 
ownership are of most significance in ownership structure, especially in emerging 
markets, the following sections are going to review the literature on the roles of 
institutional investors and controlling owners. 
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2.2.1 Controlling owner 
Different from developed countries such as US and UK where shareholder 
protection is good, publicly listed firms in most countries are usually characterized with 
concentrated ownership structure and controlled by a single and large shareholder 
(Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio et al., 2002). Previous studies name 
this kind of shareholder as controlling owner or controlling shareholder. These 
controlling owners are usually the founders of firms or their family members. According 
to the data of Classens et al. (2000), more than two thirds of controlling shareholders in 
Asian countries are family owners. In firms with controlling owners, there are little 
separation between control and ownership. These controlling owners generally own more 
control rights than cash flow rights through a pyramidal structure, cross-share holdings 
and issuing multi-class shares (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003; Yeh, 2005). Reviewing the 
literature on the role of controlling shareholder, we can find two opposite perspectives, 
namely agency perspective and stewardship perspective. 
Agency perspective 
According to the early work of agency theory, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argued that the interest conflicts between owners and managers are minimized in family 
firms. However, they also noted that family owners have the incentive to expropriate 
from minority shareholders. Later researchers developed this view as principle-principle 
conflict perspective (PP).  This expropriation can happen because controlling shareholder 
can not only control how to run his firm, but also determine how to distribute firm‟s 
profits (Classens and Fan, 2003). As long as they don‟t have 100% ownership, they may 
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consume lots of perquisites before distribute profits to other shareholders. La Porta et al. 
(2000) emphasized that expropriation from minority shareholders are more likely to 
happen in countries where there is limited investor protection. They also listed the forms 
of expropriations such as asset stripping, resource transferring and ownership dilution. 
Thus, while controlling shareholders largely reduce the agency cost of managers, whether 
their presences are good for firms depends on their expropriation behaviors. 
Based on PP perspective, researchers have done lots of studies hoping to find the 
evidence of expropriation (Joh, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Wiwattanakantang, 
2001; Yeh, 2005). Using data from Korean firms during 1993-1997, Joh (2003) found 
that controlling shareholders‟ expropriation happens when their ownership is lower. His 
study indicates the negative effect of control-ownership disparity. He also found “the 
tunneling” behavior, which is one way of expropriation among affiliates of large business 
groups. Exploiting the data from Taiwan listed firms, Yeh (2005) got the same 
conclusion as Joh (2003) that the corporate value is lower when the gap between control 
rights and cash flow rights is larger. Wiwattanakantang (2001) reported the positive 
relationship between firm value and family ownership for Thailand firms where family 
owners usually don‟t adopt pyramidal structures. Above empirical studies seem to 
confirm the expropriation behavior of controlling owners. 
Stewardship perspective 
While agency theory assumes that man is self-interested, stewardship theory 
argues that owners and managers are motivated by high order needs such as growth, 
achievement and self-actualization, and they promote pro-organizational and 
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collectivistic behaviors (Davis et al., 1997).  Since family owners‟ fortune and reputation 
are closely tied to their businesses, they have deep emotional investment and 
psychological attached to their firms (Bubolz, 2001). Burkart et al. (2003) and Casson 
(1999) claimed that family owners generally want to pass their firms to next generations. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) identified that strategic investments in family firms are long-
term oriented. Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) and David and Laurie (2008) 
suggested that family firms tend to have long-term orientation in other activities, say, 
maintaining long run relationships with debt holders and suppliers. All these points seem 
to support Miller and Le Breton-Miller‟s (2006) argument that stewardship attitude is 
more likely to breed in family business.  
Since most controlling shareholders are family owners, there are several studies 
trying to discern whether controlling owners are stewards (Eddleston and Kellermanns, 
2007; Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008). Miller et al. (2008) reported totally support 
for stewardship perspective. For instance, they found long-term orientation in strategic 
investments, firm‟s reputation and relationships with employees and customers in family 
firms. Using data from 248 family firms in food processing industry, Zahra et al. (2008) 
found that stewardship-oriented organizational culture is conducive to strategic flexibility 
and positively moderate the relationship between family commitment and strategic 
flexibility. Eddleston and Kellermanns (2007) by utilizing stewardship theory argued that 
altruism in family firm is conducive to breed a participative strategy process in which 
firms are more likely to improve performance.  
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2.2.2 Institutional investors 
Institutional investors are specialized financial institutions which consist of 
pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds (Davis and Steil, 2001). They are 
playing more and more important role in the global stock markets as their assets increases 
(Hansen and Hill, 1991). These investors usually hold diversified portfolios and provide a 
better trade-off of risk and return than individual investors. Previous scholars (see David 
et al., 2001; Hoskisson et al., 2002) classified institutional investors into two categories: 
short-term oriented and long-term oriented. Pension funds and insurance companies are 
identified as long-term investors, since they are both instruments for long-term saving 
and their goals are to get long-term returns (Fortune, 1993). Gilson and Kraakman (1991) 
suggested that pension funds emphasize indexing and usually have an investment horizon 
for about 10 years. However, mutual funds and other professional investment funds are 
more interested in short-term return, since short-term return is the most important 
indicator showing whether their management teams are competent. Individual investors 
generally choose professional investment funds according to their short-term returns. 
What‟s more, these professional investment fund managers have the incentive to compete 
in the short-term return, since their compensation is market-based (Khorana, 1996). 
As different types of institutional investors have different investment horizons and 
focuses, there monitoring powers and influences on invested firms are different (Douma 
et al, 2006). For pension funds, they are active in monitoring firms and care for firms‟ 
long-term developments (Fortune, 1993). While for mutual funds, they trade frequently 
and vote by feet when firm‟s performance is poor (Froot et al., 1992).  Based on their 
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different monitoring power and trading behavior, there have been a lot of studies done 
regarding their influences on firm performance and strategic decisions.  
2.2.3 Ownership structure and R&D investments 
Previous studies mainly use agency theory to investigate the influences of 
ownership structure on R&D investments. Agency problem happens because of interests‟ 
conflict and information asymmetry between owners and managers (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, previous researchers link R&D investments with 
ownership structure in terms of incentive misalignment and information asymmetry (Lee 
and O‟Neill, 2003).  
Incentive misalignment: Abundant of studies pointed out that top management 
teams tend to be reluctant in investing in R&D (e.g., Froot et al., 1992; Stein, 1988; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which is named as “managerial myopic” behavior. One 
thing to support this argument is that R&D investment involves high risk and high failure 
rate. While outside shareholders can diversify risk by holding diversified portfolios, 
managers cannot and bear high risk since their job safety and compensation are related to 
firms‟ performance in their contract‟s periods (Hoskisson et al., 1993; Kor, 2006; Laverty, 
1996). So managers tend to build empires and invest more in marketing and acquisition 
activities to get firm‟s good short-term performance (Kor, 2006). The other thing is that 
managers usually get pressures from stockholders who are interested in short-term 
financial return (Froot et al., 1992). These stockholders may sell their stock when they 
see the bad quarterly or annually reports (Froot et al., 1992; Lee and O‟Neill, 2003). If 
many investors have the same opinion toward the announcement of these reports, namely 
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to sell the stocks, then the firms‟ value will decrease. What‟s more, as Laverty (1996) 
argued that the professional investment institutions evaluate the value of a firm 
emphasizing less on the intangible assets which are the results of R&D investments. Thus, 
in order to get good pay and secure their jobs, managers wouldn‟t like to take the risk of 
investing on the long-run. Therefore, because of the misaligned incentives, managerial 
opportunism has been identified as one obstacle for R&D investments by many 
researchers. 
Information asymmetry: Information asymmetry between owners and managers 
would lead to the inappropriate evaluation of R&D investments (Laverty, 1996; Lee and 
O‟Neill, 2003), which is identified as another obstacle of R&D investments. One reason 
for existence of information asymmetry is that outsider stockholders have costs to collect 
information on firm‟s strategic actions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For the other, the 
nature of information on R&D investments put some obstacles for outsiders to get to 
know them (Myers, 1984). The information publication on the R&D projects would put 
the firm at a competitive disadvantage if this information provides crucial signal to its 
competitors (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). Thus, Lee and O‟Neill (2003) argued that 
frequent communication between managers and investors can help alleviate the latter 
ones‟ pressure. 
2.2.4 Empirical evidence 
Lots of empirical studies have been contributed to study the relationship between 
ownership and R&D investments using above two explanations (i.e. managerial myopic 
and information asymmetry). Most of these studies focus on the effect of institutional 
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ownership. In the 1980s, as the level of institutional ownership of public firms increases, 
researchers began to worry about its effect on long-term investment such R&D projects 
(Graves, 1988). Researchers such as Drucker (1986), Mitroff (1987) and Scherer (1984) 
held the view that institutional investors are short-term oriented which lead to their 
myopic investment strategy. However, the first empirical study done on this issue by 
Jarrell and Lehn (1985) indicated the opposite.  
The debate regarding the role of institutional investors didn‟t stop at their work, 
but led to more empirical studies. For example, using firm data in the computer industry, 
Graves (1988) found that increased institutional investor ownership decreases R&D 
investments; Baysinger et al. (1991) reported the positive effect for 176 Fortune 500 
firms; longitudinal study conducted by Hansen and Hill (1991) also indicate the positive 
effect. For the above contrary conclusions, Hoskisson et al. (2002) provided one 
persuasive argument that different types of institutional investors have different 
investment horizons. Therefore, empirical studies using datasets composed by different 
weights of types of institutional investors might lead to different conclusions.  
Regarding the effect of controlling ownership on long-term investment, empirical 
studies are sparse and most of them were done in recent years. Using panel data of U.S. 
family and non-family firms and exploiting Bayesian approach, Block and Thams (2008) 
didn‟t find evidence that family firms are more long-term oriented. However, Kim et al. 
(2008) reported that controlling owners promote R&D investments for Korean firms. 
Therefore, more empirical studies need to be done to discern the role of controlling 
owners on R&D investments. 
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2.3 Financial structure 
According to resource-based view, the resources a firm possesses decide its 
strategy. Financial factors such as financial slack and debt condition have been 
considered as important resources in determining firm‟s R&D investments. While 
organizational researchers, such as Cyert, March and Bourgeois, emphasized the 
important role of slack resources in promoting firm‟s experimentation and innovation 
activities, financial researcher, such as Myers, Majluf and Williamson, argued that debt 
condition has enormous effect on financing R&D projects. The literature on financial 
slack, leverage ratio and their relationships with R&D investments is reviewed in 
following paragraphs. 
2.3.1 Financial slack and R&D investments 
Slack resources 
The concept “slack” has been the focus of organizational literature for a long time 
since Cyert and March‟s (1963) work, and it was usually treated as independent variable 
to explain organizational behavior (Bourgeois, 1981). Since different scholars captured 
different aspects and functions of slack resources, there have been many definitions of 
organizational slack (cf. Child, 1972; Cyert and March, 1963; Litschert and Bonham, 
1978). Bourgeosi (1981) suggested a definition by paraphrasing March‟s work which was 
adopted by most researchers as follows: 
Organizational slack is that cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an organization 
to adapt successfully to internal pressures for adjustment or to external pressures for change in 
policy, as well as to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external environment. 
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As he suggested, it is important to operationalize slack in terms of measurable 
items to facilitate empirical study. Based on his work, Bourgeois and Singh (1983) 
classified slack into three categories: available slack, recoverable and potential slack. 
Sharfman et al. (1988) simplified their classification and identified slack resources from 
high discretion (e.g. cash, marketable securities) to low discretion (e.g. inventory, labor 
and low flexibility machine capacity). This paper is going to investigate the role of 
financial slack, which is one kind of high-discretion slack, including cash and receivables 
(Greve, 2003; George, 2005; Kim et al., 2008). 
Regarding to the functions of slack, there have been two contrary views. 
Proponents of slack such as Cyert and March (1963), Bourgeois (1981), Singh (1986) 
argued that slack resources allow firms to engage in experimentation and innovation 
activities. According to the economic equilibrium theory, there should be no slack in the 
equilibrium point. Thus, opponents of slack viewed it as phenomenon of inefficiency and 
argued that slack breeds the sense of complacency in organization and diminish 
incentives to innovate (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). Agency theorists such as Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Triantis (2000) suggested that slack allows managers to pursue their 
own interests and promotes undisciplined R&D projects. 
Slack and innovation 
According to the perspective from Cyert and March (1963) and their following 
proponents, it is definitely the case that slack promotes R&D activities. Several empirical 
studies have showed supports for it. Using the questionnaires data of 64 large U.S. and 
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Canadian firms and exploiting structure model equation, Singh (1986) reported that both 
absorbed and unabsorbed slack have a positive relationship with risk taking projects. 
Zajac et al. (1991) studied the factors that might enhance innovation in internal corporate 
joint venture, and found that organizational slack is positively related to innovativeness. 
However, organizational economists and agency theorists claim that slack is kind 
of unnecessary cost and is not conducive to innovation. Thus, this view predicts negative 
relationship between slack and R&D investments. Nohria and Gulati (1996) reconciled 
above contradictive views by arguing that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between slack and innovation, which was also supported by their empirical test. Kim et al. 
(2008) provided further evidence for Korean firms that the relationship between slack and 
R&D investments is curvilinear. Therefore, these studies showed that certain amount of 
slack resources is needed for innovation while too much slack indicates wastes of 
resources. 
2.3.2 Capital structure and R&D investments 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) advanced the classic proposition about the 
capital structure „irrelevance‟, the theory of capital structure started. Various theories 
such as pecking order theory, information asymmetry perspective, transaction cost theory 
and agency theory were developed to investigate organizational factors‟ influences on 
capital structure. On the other hand, capital structure is an important factor affecting the 
whole organization, from performance to strategic decisions. While researchers in the 
area of strategy mainly emphasized that the kind of strategy (innovation strategy or 
diversification strategy) a firm pursues affects capital structure, most financial 
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researchers claimed that capital structure decides strategy. In the following paragraphs, 
this paper first reviews the literature about the traditional explanations of capital structure, 
then the causal relationship between capital structure and R&D investments, and finally 
the empirical evidence. 
Traditional explanation of capital structure 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated: “in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, 
and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected 
by how that firm is financed”, which means that a firm‟s financial structure is irrelevant 
to its investment decision. This famous conclusion violated conventional wisdom at that 
time and ignited interest in the study of capital structure. However, the real world is not 
that frictionless. Several years later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) corrected their model 
by relaxing the assumption of a tax-free world and got the conclusion that the value of a 
firm is positively related to leverage ratio, which is because of the tax benefits of interest 
payments.  
While Modigliani and Miller (1963) showed the tax benefits of debt financing, 
other researchers found the costs of it. We can find two kinds of costs of debt financing 
from the literature. First, Jensen and Meckling (1976) pointed out that there‟re agency 
costs of debt. In their model, owner-manager of a firm first issues debt, and then decides 
what investments to take. In the modern corporation, owner-manager has limited liability, 
thus moral hazard problem happens. The equity holders have incentives to pursue riskier 
investment projects, since the downside risk of the investment decisions are borne by the 
bondholders. Realizing this problem, the bondholders will probably demand protection 
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via monitoring and bonding mechanisms, or demand a premium, which increases the 
costs of debt financing. Second, financial distress is another cost of debt financing. When 
a firm cannot meet its debt obligations, it causes the firm to lose value going through 
bankruptcy (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Jensen (1986) corrected the conclusion that 
there are agency costs associated with debt financing, and argued that it also has some 
benefits. Realizing that managers are self-interested and may invest in unproductive 
projects, he noted that debt financing increased the leverage ratio and deceased the 
amount of free cash flow that managers have discretion over, thus reduce the total agency 
costs within a firm. 
Another different perspective on capital structure is Myers and Majluf‟s (1984) 
pecking order theory. Their model showed that internal finance is most preferred because 
of information asymmetry and capital market imperfection. When internal finance is not 
sufficient, the firm will issue debt first and then equity. 
The links between capital structure and R&D investments 
After the classic work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), various theories were 
developed to study the puzzle of capital structure. These theories include pecking order 
theory, transaction cost theory, information asymmetry perspective. Although some of 
them indicate the influences of characteristics of R&D investments on the choice of 
financing, others study the effect of leverage ratio on R&D investments. However, these 
theories seem to predict the same relationship between leverage ratio and R&D intensity. 
Each of these theories is reviewed in the following paragraphs respectively: 
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Information asymmetries: As argued previously, regarding the investments on 
R&D activities, while the information asymmetry problem exists between managers and 
shareholders, it also exists between managers and debtholders because of the 
confidentiality nature of R&D projects (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983). As Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) pointed out, after R&D projects are financed, moral hazard problems 
may happen. Because of the limited liability, shareholders have the incentive to invest in 
riskier projects. Realizing this problem and the difficulty to monitor their behavior, 
debtholders usually demand high premium on their finance. Bah and Dumontier (2001) 
argued that his high premium makes equity financing more attractive than debt financing. 
Thus, if firms pursing innovation strategy finance R&D projects using equity, the 
leverage ratio should be maintained at a low level. 
Transaction cost theory: Williamson (1988) suggested that debt financing is 
preferred to equity when the transaction cost of negotiation is low. He argued that the 
transaction cost is positively related to asset-specificity. For example, when a firm‟s 
asset-specificity is lower, it can be easily redeployed and sold to other firm. Thus, it 
transaction cost is lower when debtholders execute the option of asset sales and 
liquidation. But when a firm‟s asset cannot be easily sold to another firm (high asset 
specificity), the cost of transferring these assets are high (Long and Ravenscraft, 1993). It 
is well known that R&D investments are highly specialized that have low redeployability.  
Therefore, the implication from Williamson‟s theory is similar to the perspective of 
information asymmetry. 
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Leverage as bonding device: Similar to above transaction cost perspective, assets 
generated by R&D investments are not only highly specialized, but also worth low value 
when severs as collateral guarantee (Long and Malitz, 1985). Without sufficient collateral 
guarantee, debt provides are unlikely to lend money to these firms. Thus, a firm invests 
too much in R&D activities cannot support high leverage ratio. On the other hand, as 
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) suggested, high leverage ratio indicating the high 
default of risk increases difficulty in funding for R&D projects. Therefore, a firm with a 
high leverage ratio is less likely to be financed. Above two points predict the negative 
relationship between leverage ratio and R&D intensity. 
Myopic cash flow generation: Peyer and Shivdasani (2001) suggested that 
debtholders prefer firms to follow stable strategies that can generate cash flow in short-
term, rather than investing in risky R&D projects. When a firm‟s leverage is higher, they 
will force managers focusing on generating cash flow to pay the interest of their debts. 
Free cash flow is very important in …Thus, reduced free cash flow makes the firm‟s 
current R&D projects uncontinuous or invests less for future projects. Whited (1992) 
supported for this view by arguing that higher leveraged firms face greater financial 
constraints. More financial constraint makes firm more difficult in getting finance for 
R&D activities. Hence, higher leverage ratio prevents firm pursuing innovation strategy 
and decreases the expenditure in R&D projects. 
Empirical evidence 
Most empirical studies have confirmed above prediction that leverage ratio is 
negatively associated with R&D intensity. Using a sample of 971 COMPUSTAT firms, 
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Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989) found strong significant negative relationship between 
the long-term leverage ratio and R&D intensity. Bhagat and Welch (1995) reported a 
negative relation between debt levels and R&D expenses. By comparing a sample of 
R&D intensive firms to a sample of non-R&D ones for firms in the UK, US, Japan and 
Europe, Bah and Dumontier (2001) found the former ones exhibit significantly lower 
leverage ratio and dividend payout ratio, but longer debt maturity and higher cash levels. 
Using a sample of large US manufacturing corporations, Singh and Faircloth (2005) 
found a strong negatively relationship between leverage ratio and the level of R&D 
expenditure that firms undertake. Jordan et al. (1998) found that innovation-based 
strategy is associated with the lowest level of debt, while cost-leadership based strategy 
had the highest leverage ratio. O‟Brien (2003) got the same conclusion that innovation-
based strategy is associated with the lower level of debt. 
However, above empirical studies were done based on the contexts of developed 
countries. Empirical studies regarding the relationship between capital structure and 
R&D investments in emerging markets are sparse. Different institutional background and 
governance mechanisms in emerging markets may change above conclusion that is 
derived from developed countries. 
2.4 Ownership structure and financial structure 
2.4.1 Ownership structure and financial slack 
Investigating the influence of ownership structure on firm‟s strategic decisions, 
performance and other aspects has been the main research area in the domain of corporate 
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governance. However, according to my literature review, rare research has been done on 
the direct relationship between ownership structure and financial slack. Most studies have 
contributed to study the relationships between ownership structure and financial policies 
such as dividend policy using agency theory. Since retained earnings are the main source 
of financial slack, we may find some implicit relationships between ownership structure 
and financial slack in the financial economics and strategy literatures. 
The link between ownership structure and financial policy is recognized in many 
early works such as Williamson (1964) and Jensen (1986). Based on their recognition, 
later scholars have done lots of studies on the relationship between managerial ownership 
and dividend policy (for example, Rozeff, 1982; Jensen et al., 1992; Eckbo and Verma, 
1994). Until 1990s, researchers began to realize the role of institutional investors in 
affecting firm‟s financial policy (for example, Chaganti and Damanpour, 1991; Bathala et 
al., 1994). As the recent increasing interests in the domain of family business, researchers 
in this area start to investigate the relationship between family ownership and dividend 
policy (for example, Faccio et al, 2001; Hu et al. 2007).  
In the eyes of agency theorists, ownership structure and dividend policy are all 
governance mechanisms that can be used to align the interests between managers and 
owners. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that increasing managerial 
ownership can help mitigate the interest conflicts between managers and owners; Rozeff 
(1982) and Easterbrook (1984) claimed that increasing dividends payout reduces the cash 
at the discretion of managers and forces them to get additional funds from external capital 
market, which in turn will monitor their behavior. Hence, managerial ownership and 
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dividends have the same function in reducing agency cost. Exploiting their substitution 
effects, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found the negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and dividend payout ratio. Using simultaneous equation, Jensen et al. (1992) 
got the same relationship.  
Regarding the role of institutional investors on dividend policy, previous studies 
are mainly based on tax-based theory and agency theory. From tax-based perspective, it 
is well known that institutional investors have tax benefits. Thus, institutional investors 
are likely to demand more dividend payout ratio. From agency perspective, Jensen (1986) 
points out that managers tend to retain cash under their control and pay less dividends. In 
order to reduce agency cost, institutional investors may force managers to pay more 
dividends (Short et al., 2002). Therefore, above two perspectives all predict the positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and dividend ratio. However, Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) claimed that there is selection procedure in which institutional investors 
choose invested firms. Empirical researches on this line also produced mixed results. 
Short et al. (2002) found the positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
dividend policy using UK panel data; using data of public U.S. firms, Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) didn‟t find any relationship between them; Kouki and Guizani (2009) 
found significant negative relationship for Tunisian firms. For above inconsistency, I 
would think the context matters on one hand. On the other hand, as Hoskisson et al. 
(2002) pointed out, institutional investors are heterogeneous and have different 
investment horizons. Hence, long-term oriented institutional investors may not demand 
too much dividends on the short run while short-oriented ones probably will do. 
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Controlling owners are criticized by researchers such as La Porta et al. (2000) and 
Faccio et al. (2002) on their expropriation behavior from minority shareholders. They are 
claimed to pay lower dividend ratio (Faccio et al., 2002). Hu et al. (2007) supported this 
argument, and found that family firms pay lower dividend than nonfamily firms. 
However, direct empirical evidence on the relationship between controlling ownership 
and dividend ratio is really sparse.  
2.4.2 Ownership structure and capital structure 
Earlier studies on the relationship between ownership structure and capital 
structure concern about the role of managerial ownership. Amihud and Lev (1981) 
argued that professional managers have undiversified employment risk and tend to reduce 
it by ensuring the viability of their firms. Since high leverage ratio increases the 
probability of financial stress, Friend and Long (1988) claimed that decreasing the debt 
holdings can reduce managers‟ employment risk. Thus, based on managers‟ self-interest 
behavior, it might be the case that they hold the debt level below the optimal level 
(Brailsford et al., 2002). 
As managerial ownership helps align the interests between managers and 
shareholders, its effect on capital structure has drawn amount of studies (see Brailsford et 
al., 2002; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen et al., 1992). Incentive alignment will 
prompt manager to behave on the behalf of shareholders (Morck et al., 1988). Thus, 
increasing managerial ownership will increase debt holding. However, as their ownership 
increases to a point, McConnell and Servaes (1990) argued that entrench effect will 
dominate and results in managerial opportunism. Therefore, above logic suggests an 
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inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and leverage ratio.  
Brailsford et al. (2002) found support for this argument while most of earlier studies such 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Jensen et al. (1992) found a negative relationship. 
From the agency perspective, most of governance mechanisms are designed to 
constraint managerial opportunism. The role of institutional investors is identified as a 
way to increasing shareholders‟ monitoring power (Friend and Lang, 1998). Thus, when 
managers pursue a strategy that the debt level is below optimal, institutional investors 
may have influence in countering their decision. Therefore, this perspective predicts the 
positive relationship between leverage ratio and institutional ownership. Brailsford et al. 
(2002) supported for this perspective. However, an alternative view leads the opposite 
conclusion. Jensen‟s (1986) cash flow theory indicates that debt is a way to reduce 
agency cost, since interest payment of debt reduces managers‟ control over firm‟s cash 
flow. Thus, debt policy has been viewed as internal governance mechanism by agency 
theorists in restricting managers‟ self-interest pursuing behavior where institutional 
investors play the same function (Grossman and Hart, 1980). According this view, debt 
policy and the role of institutional investors can be substituted by each other. Hence, a 
negative relationship is expected between them, which is also supported by Bathala et al. 
(1994)‟s empirical study. 
As the resurgence in the area of family business, several studies have contributed 
to investigate the capital structure in family firms (King and Santor, 2008; Mishra and 
McConaughy, 1999). As similar to managers, controlling owners hold undiversified 
stakes in their firms. Thus, they care for firm‟s viability and long-term development 
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(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). On the 
other hand, family owners fear losing control over their firm (Mishra and McConaughy, 
1999). In addition, Burkart et al. (2003) argued that family owners suffer far more lose 
than just their assets when going bankruptcy. Hence, family owners have much more 
incentive than any types of shareholders in maintaining control and ensuring firms‟ 
survival (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). Therefore, King and Santor (2008) and 
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) argued that family firms tend to be more risk aversion 
and maintain lower level of debt ratio than nonfamily firms. Their empirical studies 
showed supports for this view. 
2.5 Summary 
By reviewing the literature, I found two main determinants of R&D investments, 
namely ownership structure and financial structure. However, according to my 
knowledge, the literature on the determinants of R&D investments is incomplete, since 
these two research streams treat ownership structure and financial structures as separate 
factors, even though there are some arguments and empirical evidences showing these 
two are interdependent. For example, ownership structure affects firm‟s financial policy 
and capital structure. Therefore, the extant literature ignores the potential interplay of 
ownership structures and financial structures in decisions where R&D investments are 
determined, which may lead to false attribution of causality between those factors and 
R&D investments.  
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CHAPTER 3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Ownership structure and R&D investments 
3.1.1 Controlling ownership and R&D investments 
Controlling owners in Korean firms are usually founders and founders‟ relatives, 
they often present on the board of directors or top management teams (Kim et al., 2008). 
As such, controlling owners often have great influence on their firms‟ strategic decisions. 
While agency problems may be severe in professional manager-managed firms, 
managerial opportunism is largely restricted in firms with controlling owners, since 
managers are under effective monitoring or controlling owners may be managers 
themselves. Therefore, according to the upper-echelons perspective, in Korean context, 
we can conclude that firms‟ R&D investment decisions, to a large extent, depend on 
controlling owners‟ intentions.  
Reviewing the literature, I have found two conflicting voices about the role of 
controlling owner, namely PP perspective and stewardship perspective. And most of 
previous studies that done using above two perspectives generally tried to investigate the 
relationship between controlling ownership and firm performance. It is obvious as Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) suggested that expropriation behavior is detrimental to 
firm performance while stewards can help improve firm performance. While these two 
conflicting views may predict the opposites regarding the influences of controlling 
ownership on performance, I argue that they don‟t have conflicts in predicting the 
relationship between controlling ownership and R&D intensity.  
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Controlling owners can be psychologically tied to their firms (Le Breton-Miller 
and Miller, 2006) and want to pass firms to their heirs (Burkart et al.,2003; Casson, 1999). 
They can also be long-term oriented in making strategic decisions (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003), and maintain long run relationships with employees and suppliers (Le Breton-
Miller and Miller, 2006; David and Laurie, 2008). At the same time, they may pay little 
dividend ratio and expropriate from minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Young 
et al., 2008). But as long as controlling owners care for firm‟s viability and long-term 
development (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and realize that 
R&D investments can help firm generate competitive capabilities (Franko, 1989), they 
would like to invest more in R&D activities.  
Previous studies investigated the influences of ownership structure on R&D 
investments mainly using perspectives derived from agency theory, namely managerial 
myopic and information asymmetry. Exploiting these perspectives also suggests a positive 
relationship between controlling ownership and R&D intensity. For the managerial 
myopic problem, no matter the firm is owner-managed or not, managers pursuing self-
interest behavior should be largely restricted as controlling ownership increases, because 
the benefits of monitoring increase. According to Lee and O‟Neill (2003), increased 
ownership would increase owners‟ incentive to collect information about R&D projects, 
which leads to their appropriation valuation on these projects. What‟s more, controlling 
owners usually grow with their firms and are very familiar with the businesses and 
projects. Thus, they will evaluate R&D activities appropriately. Therefore, in the firms 
with controlling owners, the problems of managerial myopic and information asymmetry 
which impede managers from investing in R&D projects don‟t exist anymore. 
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Therefore, both stewardship theory and agency theory predict the positive 
relationship between controlling ownership and R&D intensity. 
H1: Controlling ownership is positively associated with R&D intensity. 
3.1.2 Institutional ownership and R&D investments 
Foreign institutional ownership in emerging markets is mostly owned by 
institutional investors from U.S. and European countries (Choe et al., 1999). As the 
economies globalized and liberalized, these investors hold more and more diversified 
percentages of stock portfolios in emerging markets to reduce systematic risk.  According 
to the statistics published in Business Week (2006), foreign ownership has increased to 42% 
of public Korean firms in terms of capitalization in year 2006. Although the aggregate 
ownership is large, their ownerships are usually dispersed as long as their goals are to 
diversify risk. Korean laws also don‟t allow foreign investor to hold a large proportion of 
shares in one company (Jung and Kwon, 2002). Another characteristic of foreign 
institutional investors is that they trade frequently (David et al., 2006), since most of 
foreign investors are professional investment companies who tend to have short-term 
horizons and need to shuffle their portfolios. These characteristics and their orientation 
make them behave like Korean domestic financial institutional investors (Choe et al., 
1999; Kim et al., 2008). Thus, in the following paragraphs, I will use the term 
“institutional investors” refer to foreign institutional investors and domestic financial 
institutional investors. 
For the role of institutional investors, most prior studies have showed the positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and R&D investments (Hansen and Hill, 
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1991; Hill and Snell, 1988). For these studies, their argument is that increased ownership 
reduce information asymmetry problem, which lead to their appropriate evaluation on 
firms‟ innovation activities. Hoskisson et al. (2002) provided more detailed analysis of 
institutional investors. They argued that different types of institutional investors have 
different strategy orientation. Since these studies are all done in U.S. context, the focus is 
on the conflicting preferences between institutional investors and managers concerning 
about R&D projects, where there is an agent context according to Lee and O‟Neill (2003) 
and the latter ones are supposed to prefer short-term investments.  
However, the case is different in Korea where the conflicting preferences are 
between institutional investors and controlling owners. While the latter ones are usually 
strategic investors who prefer R&D investments, I argue that some conditions make 
institutional investors more likely to be short-term oriented compare to the U.S. context. 
First, weak laws on shareholder protection don‟t guarantee investors‟ return (La Porta et 
al., 2000). Second, most of foreign investors are investment companies and less of them 
are pension funds. In addition, according to Hoskisson et al. (2002), foreign institutional 
investors tend not to be interested in R&D investments.  
While prior studies that support the positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and R&D investments assuming that institutional investors have pressures on 
managers in U.S., I argue they may not have influence on controlling owners in Korea. 
David et al. (2001) found that ownership alone is not sufficient to firms‟ R&D 
investments decisions. And they argue that only engaging in activism such as initiation of 
shareholder proposals, negotiations with managers and the launching of proxy contests 
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can have effect on managers‟ decision. However, in Korean, institutional investors are 
not allowed to exercise voting rights based on the “shadow voting” rule before the 1997 
financial crisis (Hong and Lee, 1998).  Although this restriction was removed after the 
crisis and other corporate governance reforms implemented in Korea, the power and 
influence of institutional investors is still not as strong as theirs in US (Solomon et al., 
2002). Therefore, I get the following hypothesis: 
H2: Institutional ownership is not associated with R&D intensity. 
3.2 The mediating effects of financial structures  
3.2.1 Financial slack and R&D investments 
Although existing literature indicated two contrary views on the role of financial 
slack on innovation, namely promoting innovation and wastes of resources, I would think 
they have the same implication on the relationship between financial slack and R&D 
investments. First, proponents of slack all agreed that more slack resources allow firms to 
take more experimentation and engage in more R&D activities (Bourgeois, 1981; Cyert 
and March, 1963). Second, opponents of slack emphasized that too much slack resources 
are the indicator of inefficiency and allow managers to pursue their own interests, for 
example, engaging in excessive diversification and investing more in unproductive R&D 
projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, opponents of slack resources acknowledge 
that more resources will lead to more R&D activities but may not lead to more innovation. 
Innovation is the result of R&D investments, but not all R&D investments would lead to 
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innovation. As Holmstrom (1989) pointed out, innovation requires both strong 
managerial incentives and careful monitoring.  
As long as this paper concerns about the determinants of R&D investments, these 
above two views all support the argument that more financial slack would lead to more 
R&D investments where the opponent view claimed that these R&D investments may not 
be transformed to innovation.  
3.2.2 Leverage ratio and R&D investments 
According to pecking order theory, because of information asymmetry problem, 
internal finance is first preferred, then debt and equity is ranked at the bottom among this 
three. However, the characteristics of R&D activities make information asymmetry 
problem severer and debt financing more inappropriate than equity (Bah and Dumontier, 
2001). So firms who want to invest in R&D projects have to finance internally or through 
equity. Hence, firms pursuing innovativeness should exhibit lower leverage ratio. 
Transaction cost theory tells us that transaction cost is positively related to asset-
specificity (Williamson, 1988). R&D investment is considered to be highly specialized 
and the results of it such as patents are not easily deployed by other firms, which makes 
R&D assets as poor collateral. Thus, R&D investments cannot support a high level of 
debt (Long and Malitz, 1995).  
Above theories all investigate the effects of R&D investments on capital structure. 
However, capital structure also influences R&D investments in turn. Higher debt ratio 
increases the probability of bankruptcy and the difficulty in financing for R&D projects 
(Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). Whited (1992) supported this view by arguing that 
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higher leveraged firms face greater financial constraints. Therefore, increased leverage 
ratio is associated with less R&D investments. No matter how R&D investments affects 
capital structure and how leverage ratio influences R&D investments, above perspectives 
all predict the negative relationship between the two. 
3.2.3 The mediating effects of financial slack 
Controlling owner 
Controlling owners are identified by previous researchers as long-term oriented 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; David and Laurie, 2008), it is unlikely that these firms would 
pay large amount of dividends (Jensen et al., 1992; Hu et al., 2007), since more retained 
earnings can help firm get out of financial distress and grasp growth opportunities 
(Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). What‟s more, according to the tax policy, as 
controlling owners are generally individuals, they will pay higher dividend tax ratio than 
institutional investors. Thus, controlling owners probably would prefer lower dividend 
ratio to avoid high tax rate. Hu et al. (2007) provided evidence for above argument that 
family firms tend to have lower dividend payout ratio than nonfamily firms. Lower 
dividends payout ratio increases firm‟s financial slack indirectly. 
 Controlling owners are identified as psychologically tied to their firms and even 
take them as “children” (Bubolz, 2001). Thus, they have strong incentive to maintain and 
ensure control over their firms (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). As issuing equity will 
dilute their control, study of De Angelo and De Angelo (1985) indicates that controlling 
owners usually issue non-voting stocks. As the market imperfection and information 
asymmetry problems make external finance such as equity and debt more expensive 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984), controlling owners are more 
likely to rely on internal finance. Internal finance generally comes from firm‟s retained 
earnings, which are important part of financial slack. Hence, I predict that controlling 
owners tend to maintain high level of financial slack. 
Institutional investors 
From the agency perspective, institutional owners tend to demand more dividends 
in order to reduce agency costs. However, there is no consistent empirical conclusion 
about it (see Grinstein and Michaely, 2005; Kouki and Guizani, 2009; Short et al., 2002). 
Based on the implication from Hoskisson et al. (2002) that institutional investors are 
heterogeneous, I argue that the relationship between dividend payout ratio and 
institutional ownership depends on the types of top management teams and institutional 
investors. In the context of Korea, it is clear that the top management teams are usually 
controlled by family owners to a large extent. As suggested by La Porta et al. (2000), 
they may behave like entrenched managers who will expropriate from minority investors. 
Thus, their expropriation incentives and poor shareholder protection will force 
institutional investors demand more dividends. In addition, institutional investors in 
emerging markets are usually mutual funds and other types of professional investors who 
are short-term oriented. So these institutional investors focus on the short-term return 
rather than long-term return.  Hence, for the certain environment in Korea, it is likely that 
institutional ownership is positively related to dividend payout ratio.  
The problem is whether institutional investors can affect controlling owners‟ 
financial policies or not. Controlling owners may need the presences of institutional 
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investors on their firms‟ shareholders list to signal outsider investors that their firms are 
well run. So they may pay more dividend ratio to please these institutional investors. 
What if controlling owners don‟t take this action? I argue that institutional investors can 
still adjust their portfolios and choose the companies that pay high dividend ratio, since 
they short-term oriented. Higher dividend ratio decreased financial slack, since more 
dividends reduce retained earnings. Therefore, this paper predicts that institutional 
ownership is negatively associated with financial slack. 
3.2.4 The mediating effects of leverage ratio 
Controlling owner 
Existing literature on ownership and capital structure indicates that the level of 
financial leverage depends on “manager‟s risk aversion, the costs of monitoring and 
bankruptcy, the threat of takeovers, and the growth opportunities of the firm” (King and 
Santor, 2008: 2425). However, these views are developed in developed markets. In the 
Korean context, the threats of takeover are very seldom. As there is little separation 
between ownership and management, agency cost of managers is largely restricted. So 
firm leverage ratio mainly depends on controlling owners‟ risk aversion, the cost of 
bankruptcy and growth opportunity.  
For their undiversified and large stakes in firms, controlling owners are identified 
to be more risk averse than professional managers, since they will lose more than just 
their assets (Burkard et al., 2003). As emphasized by Mishra and McConaughy (1999) 
that family owners have strong desire to maintain control over their firms and care for 
firm‟s survival, the cost of losing control and bankruptcy is extremely large. Although 
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high leverage ratio increases the probability of financial distress, financing through equity 
causes other problems. First, underdeveloped equity market in Korea makes the cost of 
equity financing much more expensive. It is wildly recognized that Korea corporate 
governance is bank-oriented, which makes financing through debt much cheaper. Second, 
financing through equity diluted controlling owners‟ control over their firms. It is the 
case what controlling owners fear most. Therefore, in order to grow their firms and get 
finance for strategic investments, but not to weaken their controls, they are more likely to 
finance through debt rather than equity. According to this argument, it is expected that 
controlling ownership is positively associated with leverage ratio. 
Institutional investors 
Agency theorists view both outsider ownership concentration and debt financing 
as monitoring devices. Because of substitution effects between these two, increased 
institutional ownership makes debt financing less necessary. According to the signaling 
model, the presence of institutional investor gives minority shareholders confidence and 
signals that the firm is committed (Wiwattanakantang, 1999). Hence, these two theories 
predict the negative relationship between leverage ratio and institutional ownership.  
Institutional investors‟ frequently trading behaviors which increase the stock 
liquidity can help reduce information asymmetry (Brennan and Tamarowshi, 2000), 
which further reduce the cost of capital. What‟s more, the presence of institutional 
investors on shareholder list gives debtors more confidence that that firm is well-
managed and has low risk of default. Thus, institutional investors may influence 
controlling owners‟ finance decisions (David et al., 2006). It is well known that Korean 
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firms are highly leveraged even after 1997 financial crisis. From the lesson of that crisis, 
institutional investors may force firms to reduce debt ratio or may tend to choose the 
firms that present low level of debt to protect their held stake (Grinstein and Michaely, 
2005). Therefore, this paper predicts the negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and leverage ratio. 
Based on the above arguments, I get the following relationships between 
ownership structure, financial structure and R&D investments (refer to Figure 1 and 
Figure 2): 
H3a: Financial slack mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and R&D 
intensity, such that financial slack increases the positive effect of controlling ownership 
on R&D intensity; 
H3b: Financial slack mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and 
R&D intensity, such that institutional ownership indirectly negatively affects R&D 
intensity; 
H4a: Leverage ratio mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and R&D 
intensity, such that leverage ratio decreases the positive effect of controlling ownership 
on R&D intensity; 
H4b: Leverage ratio mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D 
intensity, such that institutional ownership indirectly positively affects R&D intensity. 
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Figure 1. Proposed model of relationships between controlling ownership, 
leverage ratio, financial slack and R&D investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Proposed model of relationships between institutional ownership, 
leverage ratio, financial slack and R&D investments. 
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CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL STUDY 
4.1 Data and measurements 
4.1.1 Sample 
To test these hypotheses, I used a database developed by the Korea Investor 
Service, which contains information about company‟s profiles, ownership structure and 
financial structure for all Korean publicly listed firms. The data structure is similar to 
those found in COMPUSTST, and has been used by many previous scholars (see Chang 
and Hong, 2002; Kim et al., 2008). Since R&D investment is relatively more important 
for manufacturing industry, I selected companies in this industry during the 1995-2007 
periods. After eliminating observations with incomplete information, there were 999 
firms and 10518 firm-years left for analysis. 
4.1.2 Measurements 
Dependent and independent variables  
Dependent variable: R&D intensity (rdint), was measured by the ratio of 
expenditure to total sales. This measure has been widely used by previous studies (e.g., 
Greve, 2003; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Kim et al., 2008).  
Independent variables: (1) Financial slack (fs), was measured by the ratio of 
operation cash flow to total sales. According to Singh (1986), financial slack can be 
measure by the ratio of quick assets (such as cash and receivables) to total assets or total 
sales. Operation cash flow consists of these quick assets.  
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(2) Leverage ratio (da), was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets.  
(3) Controlling ownership (owner_p), was measured by the percentage of equity 
shares owned by the person who actually controls the firm and his/her family members 
and relatives.  
(4) Institutional ownership (inst_p), was measured by the adding foreign 
institutional ownership and domestic institutional ownership. Domestic institutional 
ownership is the total percentage of equity ownership held by domestic institutional 
investors composed of insurance companies, securities firms, and merchant banks, while 
foreign institutional ownership is the total percentage of equity ownership held by foreign 
financial institutions. These variables and their corresponding abbreviations are listed in 
table 1. 
Control variables 
(1) ROA (roa): net income divided by total assets. ROA indicates the profitability 
of a firm which would influence firm‟s strategic decisions directly. Many empirical 
studies, e.g., Lotta Vänänen‟s (2003), showed support for it. The profitability of a firm is 
also likely to affect its dividend payout ratio and capital structure (Jensen et al., 1992). 
 (2) Firm size (emp): the total number of employees. Firm size is considered to be 
a main factor to explain firm-specific heterogeneity. Choi et al. (2008) showed the 
necessity to control it for Korean firms. 
 (3) Industry R&D intensity (inddrint): average of R&D intensity in the each 
detailed industry. It is reasonable to account for industry effect, since the importance of 
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R&D investments to the industry of food products and beverages is different to its 
importance to the industry of rubber and plastics products.  
(4) Total assets (logta): take the natural log value of total asset. Crutchley and 
Hansen (1989)‟s empirical study showed its influence on dividend payout ratio and 
capital structure.  
(5) Affiliated  (bgmember): dummy variable, to control for the affiliated effect. 
Affiliated to a business group is very common in Korean firms. This affiliation would 
have effect on firm‟s corporate governance mechanisms and possessed resources 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).  
(6) Export ratio (exportr): the ratio of total export to total sales. Choi et al. (2008) 
showed the necessity to control it, because it may be the case that internationally oriented 
firms tend to invest more in R&D activities, which would enhance their competitiveness 
in international market.  
(7) Growth opportunity (go): the increased ratio of total sale. Early studies (e.g., 
David et al., 2006; Wright et al., 1996) talked about the efficiency of R&D investments 
by investigating whether these R&D investments are made consistent with growth 
opportunity. Thus, it can be expected that when growth opportunity appears, firm is more 
likely to investment in R&D activities. What‟s more, previous studies (e.g. Jensen et al., 
1992; Eckbo and Verma, 1994) have showed that growth opportunity affects firm‟s 
capital structure and financial slack.  
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(8) Dividend ratio (divr): the percentage of cash dividend amount divided by total 
assets. Agency theorists view dividend policy as a tool to reduce agency cost, which is 
similar to the function of debt financing. So dividend ratio might have substitute effect on 
leverage ratio. As a source of financial slack, dividend ratio is supposed to affect 
financial slack. All control variables and their corresponding abbreviations are listed in 
table 1. 
Table 1. All variables and their corresponding abbreviations 
Variables Corresponding 
abbreviations 
R&D intensity rdint 
Financial slack fs 
Debt ratio da 
Controlling ownership owner_p 
Institutional ownership inst_p 
ROA roa 
Firm size emp 
Industry R&D intensity inddrint 
Total assets logta 
Affiliated bgmember 
Export ratio exportr 
Growth opportunity go 
Dividend ratio divr 
 
4.2 Summary statistics and model design 
4.2.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 gives out the sample distribution among each year. From this table, we 
can see that the data sample is an unbalance panel. As more and more firms went public, 
the number of sample increased in the later years. In the year 1995, the size of Korean 
stock market is 566, and it increased to 980 in the year 2007.  
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Table 2. Sample distribution among each year 
Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
1995 566 5.38 5.38 
1996 614 5.84 11.22 
1997 645 6.13 17.35 
1998 670 6.37 23.72 
1999 711 6.76 30.48 
2000 763 7.25 37.74 
2001 836 7.95 45.68 
2002 897 8.53 54.21 
2003 938 8.92 63.13 
2004 951 9.04 72.17 
2005 966 9.18 81.36 
2006 981 9.33 90.68 
2007 980 9.32 100.00 
Total 10,518 100.00 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Firms’ R&D intensity on average in the period of 1995-2007 
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Figure 4. Firms’ ROA on average in the period of 1995-2007 
 
 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 give out the trends of firm‟s R&D intensity and ROA on 
average in the period of 1995-2007. From Figure 3, we can see that R&D intensity firms 
increased in first several years and decreased after the year 2001. The trend for ROA is 
much more complicated than the trend for R&D intensity. From Figure 4, we can see 
that there is a deep decrease in the year 1998, and then a sharp increase in the following 
two years, and the main tread of the remaining years is decreasing. We may explain the 
first decrease by 1997‟s financial crisis, after which Korean firms cut down budget to 
invest in R&D activities. However, we still don‟t know what caused the complicated 
change in Korean firms‟ R&D intensity after the year 2000. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics for all variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
rdint 10518 .0246 .0468 0 .4880 
fs 10518 .0424 .1947 -5.438 1.490 
da 10518 .4944 .2081 .0110 .9992 
owner_p 10518 .2591 .2236 0 1 
inst_p 10518 .0563 .1254 0 1 
divr 10518 .0076 .0123 0 .2807 
roa 10518 .0321 .1461 -.9888 .9731 
emp 10518 697.43 3368.7 1 85813 
indrdint 10518 .0684 .1496 0 .8863 
logta 10518 10.95 1.492 5.198 17.993 
bgmember 7765 .1030 .3040 0 1 
go 9677 .1266 .3886 -5.337 5.613 
exportr 10518 .2885 .3105 0 1 
 
Table 3 is the summary statistics for all variables. From this table, we can see that 
the numbers of observations for variables bgmember and go are less that others‟. For the 
former one, it is because there‟re some missing values in my data; while for the latter one, 
the value of go is missing in the beginning year for a firm, since I take the first year as a 
base year.  The mean value for R&D intensity (rdint) is 0.0246 and the maximum value is 
0.0468, which indicates the large variance of R&D intensity of Korean firms. It is same 
case indicated by Lee and O‟Neill (2003)‟s study. The variance for financial slack (fs) is 
even larger, since the minimum value is -5.438, the maximum is 1.490 while the mean is 
0.0424. While many scholars have attributed the causes of 1997‟s financial crisis to the 
high leverage ratio of Korean Chaebols, the leverage ratio reduced a lot after Korean 
government‟s reform. The mean value of leverage ratio (da) is 0.4944. But there are still 
some firms with high leverage ratio, since the maximum value is 0.9992. The mean value 
of controlling ownership (owner_p) and institutional ownership (inst_p) are 0.2591 and 
0 .0563. 
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4.2.2 Model 
In order to indentify the direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on R&D 
investments, this paper builds a simultaneous equation model as follows: 
           rdint = f (fs, da, exportr, emp, roa, go, bgmember, indrint, owner_p, inst_p)         (1) 
           fs= g (owner_p, inst_p, divr, logta, roa, go)                                                            (2) 
           da= h (owner_p, inst_p, divr, logta, roa, go)                                                           (3) 
It is usually the case that top management team makes the budget plans and 
strategic decision at the beginning fiscal year, so the factors this year are likely to 
influence next year‟s R&D investments. Thus, the variables in the right side of equation 
(1) were all lagged by one year except the affiliation indicator, bgmember. In equation (2) 
and equation (3) only ownership variables were lagged by one year, since the ownership 
effect maybe hysteretic. From above simultaneous equations, we can see that equation (2) 
and equation (3) are independent from equation (1) while equation (1) depends on the 
other two. Hence, I estimate equation (2) and equation (3) independently and use two-
stage estimation for equation (1). For the estimation of equation (2) and equation (3), I 
exploit the most common method, namely Fixed Effect model. To test whether Fixed 
Effect model is appropriate, the F statistics and Hausman statistics are reported in the 
result.  
One characteristic of R&D investment is long investment horizon. While one 
R&D project is ratified and starts to implement, various resources are needed 
continuously. So it is more likely the case that the expenditure of R&D investments this 
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year is related to it in the last year. Thus, I add lagged dependent variables as independent 
variables. For such model setting, it may cause biased estimation while using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS). Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, 
Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that the lagged dependent and explanatory 
variables are valid instruments, under the assumption that the error terms are not serially 
correlated. The GMM estimator in such a situation achieves asymptotic efficiency. The 
dynamic panel GMM estimation method has advantageous capacities to deal with 
unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity, endogeneity problems, and the presence of the 
unknown heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in panel data (Arellano 2003). Therefore, 
I used the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation and dynamic panel data 
model – Arellano-Bond regression for equation (1) in the second stage. However, the 
validity of the GMM estimation relies on the validity of the assumption that the error 
terms are not serially correlated. If the assumption is valid, there should be evidence of 
significant negative first-order serial correlation in difference residuals and no evidence 
of second-order serial correlation in the difference residuals (Baltagi 2005). Thus, I test 
this assumption with an Arellano-Bond test of second-order serial correlation. 
4.3 Results 
Table 4 is the correlation matrix for all the variables. From this table, we can see 
that the correlation coefficients between these variables are all not very high, which 
reduces the probability of multicollinearity problem. 
The estimation results of equation (2) and equation (3) are illustrated in Table 5. 
From the two Hausman statistics and F statistics, we can see that Fixed effect (F.E.) 
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models are appropriate. From the results in Table 5, we can conclude that both 
controlling ownership and institutional ownership influence financial slack and leverage 
ratio significantly. Hypothesis 3a predicts that controlling ownership positively affects 
financial slack. The regression coefficient of controlling ownership (owner_p) in 
equation (1) is 0.0306 and is statistically significant, which is consistent with my 
prediction. Hypothesis 3b predicts that institutional ownership negatively affects financial 
slack. The regression coefficient of institutional ownership (inst_p) in equation (1) is 
negative and statistically significant, which indicates my prediction is correct. 
My predictions about the influence of ownership structure on capital structure are 
that controlling ownership positively affects leverage ratio while institutional ownership 
negatively affects leverage ratio. However, the estimation results in equation (2) don‟t 
show support for the effect of controlling ownership on leverage ratio but support for the 
effect of institutional ownership, since the regress coefficients of controlling ownership 
(owner_p) and institutional ownership (inst_p)  in equation (2) are -0.0308 and -0.0491, 
and both them are statistically significant. 
To dismantle the direct and indirect effects of ownership structure on R&D 
investments, I used two-stage estimation method. First, to estimate the direct effect of 
controlling ownership on R&D investments, I regressed controlling ownership (owner_p) 
on financial slack (fs), leverage ratio (da) and other variables and got the predicted value 
of owner_p, which is uncorrelated with fs, da. Then, I substituted the owner_p with the 
predicted value of owner_p in equation (1). Repeat the same procedures for institutional 
ownership (inst_p). Finally, I did the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation for 
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equation (1). Hence, in the regression results of Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data 
estimation, the coefficient for controlling ownership (owner_p) is the direct effect of 
controlling ownership on R&D investments, while the coefficient for institutional 
ownership (inst_p) is the direct effect of institutional ownership on R&D investments. 
The two-stage estimation results for the direct and indirect effects of controlling 
ownership and institutional ownership on R&D investments are presented in Table 6.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that controlling ownership is positively associated with 
R&D intensity. From Table 6, we can see that the coefficient of controlling ownership 
(owner_p) is 0.1008 and statistically significant, which means that controlling ownership 
has direct positive effect on R&D investments. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that institutional ownership has no impact on R&D intensity. The 
coefficient of institutional ownership (inst_p) is -0.0525 but not statistically significant, 
which means that institutional ownership has no direct negative effect on R&D 
investments. So hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H4a, H4b argue that financial slack and leverage ratio are 
mediators through which controlling owners and institutional investors influence R&D 
investments. From Table 6, we can see that the coefficients signs for leverage ratio (da) 
and financial slack (fs) are negative and positive, and both of them are significant, which 
are consistent with my predictions that more financial slack will lead to more R&D 
investments while higher leverage ratio is associated with less R&D investments.  
Combined with the results presented in Table 5, namely controlling ownership is 
positively associated with financial slack and negatively associated with leverage ratio 
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while institutional ownership is negatively associated with both financial slack and 
leverage ratio, we can conclude: (1) financial slack positively mediates the relationship 
between controlling ownership and R&D intensity; (2) financial slack negatively 
mediates the relationship between institutional ownership and R&D intensity; (3) 
leverage ratio positively mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and 
R&D intensity; (4) leverage ratio positively mediates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and R&D intensity.  Therefore, Hypotheses H3a, H3b, H4b are 
supported, but hypothesis H4a is not supported. 
4.4 Robustness test 
To check the robustness of above empirical results, I did the following tests:  
(1) Delete observations where R&D intensity is above its mean three standard 
deviations. After this deletion, repeat the analysis model in Table 5 and Table 6, I found 
that both controlling ownership and institutional ownership influences financial structures, 
namely financial slack and leverage ratio, significantly with the same impacts as I got in 
above empirical studies. I also found that controlling ownership affects R&D intensity 
directly while institutional ownership has no direct impact on it. Compared to earlier 
study, the only difference after this deletion is that the prediction “financial slack 
positively affects R&D intensity” is not supported. Detailed result is presented in Table 7 
and Table 8 in Appendix A.  
(2) After the 1997‟s financial crisis, Korean government has initiated some 
corporate governance reforms. To control for the effects of these institutional change, I 
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choose the sample after year 1997. Consistent with earlier study, I got the same 
relationships between ownership structure, financial structure and R&D investments. 
Detailed result is presented in Table 9 and Table 10 in Appendix B.  
(3) Use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure firm size. In the primary 
analysis, I used the number of employees to measure firm size. However, the natural 
logarithm total assets is an alternative measure of firm size that is wildly used in the areas 
of finance of strategy. Substitute Ln(totoal assets) for the number of employees and 
repeat the analysis model in Table 6, I found that no differences compared to the results 
in Table 6. Detailed result of this change is presented in Appendix C.  
(4) Delete some insignificant control variables. From Table 6, we can see that the 
control variables such as firm size (emp), ROA and affiliated (bgmember) don‟t have 
significant influence on R&D intensity.  Dropping these control variables, the results 
found in earlier study still don‟t change. Detailed result is presented in Appendix D. 
From above model changes and tests, we can see that the results found in my 
primary study are not changed, indicating the robustness of these results.
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
 rdint exportr indrdint emp roa da fs owner_p inst_p go logta bgmember divr 
rdint 1.000             
exportr 0.005 1.000            
indrdint 0.167 0.098 1.000           
emp 0.013 0.136 -0.006 1.000          
roa -0.111 0.011 -0.011 0.030 1.000         
da -0.178 0.028 -0.049 0.070 -0.248 1.000        
fs -0.094 0.064 -0.017 0.067 0.445 -0.149 1.000       
owner_p -0.092 -0.032 -0.064 -0.077 0.187 -0.114 0.133 1.000      
inst_p -0.042 0.052 0.085 0.183 0.095 0.107 0.093 -0.054 1.000     
go -0.073 0.003 0.023 0.010 0.301 -0.004 0.201 0.046 0.033 1.000    
logta -0.156 0.196 -0.106 0.491 0.092 0.194 0.142 -0.038 0.298 0.012 1.000   
bgmember -0.078 0.138 -0.067 0.376 0.029 0.159 0.074 0.024 0.186 0.010 0.622 1.000  
divr -0.046 0.004 -0.016 0.002 0.314 -0.381 0.232 0.153 0.021 0.132 -0.005 -0.026 1.000 
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Table 5. Panel Regression Results for equation (2) and equation (3) 
 Dependent variable:  
Financial slack (fs) 
Dependent variable:  
Leverage ratio (da) 
Independent variables Coef. Coef. 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.0306
** 
(.0107) 
-.0308
***
  
(.0078) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.0428
* 
(.0183) 
-.0491
*** 
(.0134) 
Dividend ratio 
(divrt-1) 
.0860  
(.1982) 
-1.551
*** 
(.1451) 
Ln(total assets) 
(logtat-1) 
.0121
**
  
(.0043) 
.0017  
(.0031) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
.3093
*** 
(.0163) 
-.1446
***
   
(.0119) 
Growth Opportunity 
(got-1) 
.0222
*** 
(.0052) 
.0189
***  
(.0038) 
_cons -.1029*  
(.0460) 
.6566
***
  
(.0336) 
Obs. 8486 8486 
Firm 991 991 
F Stat. 2.86***
 
12.21
*** 
Hausman Stat. 254.83
***
 171.63
***
 
Model F.E. F.E. 
R-square 0.0823 0.3124 
 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%; 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
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Table 6. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
 Dependent variable:  
R&D intensity (rdint) 
Independent variables Coef. 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-1) 
.4098
*** 
(.0254) 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-2) 
-.0473
** 
(.0152) 
Leverage ratio  
(dat-1) 
-.0233
*** 
(.0048) 
Financial slack  
(fst-1) 
.0068
* 
(.0035) 
Export ratio  
(exportrt-1) 
-.0061
+ 
(.0034) 
Firm size 
 (empt-1) 
-5.27e-07  
(7.10e-07) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
.0008  
(.0043) 
Growth Opportunity  
(got-1) 
.0120
***
  
(.0013) 
Affilated 
(bgmember) 
.0021  
(.0065) 
Industry R&D intensity 
(indrdintt-1) 
-.0072
** 
(.0028) 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.1008
**
   
(.0390) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.0525  
(.0726) 
_cons .0233***  
(.0064) 
Obs. 5740 
Firm 901 
Wald stat. 436.08*** 
Sargan Stat. 491.22*** 
AR(1) -5.45*** 
AR(2) .977 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%. 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusions 
Realizing the importance of R&D investments to firm‟s survival and growth, this 
paper investigated the determinants of R&D investments in Korean context. Exploiting 
simultaneous equation modeling technique, this paper obtained the following conclusions: 
(1) Controlling owners have direct impact on firms‟ strategic decisions, and they 
promote R&D investments. Apart from this direct effect, controlling owners 
tend to maintain high level of financial slack and low level of leverage ratio, 
with both financial factors increase R&D investments; 
(2) Institutional investors have no direct impact on R&D investment because of 
the corporate governance environment where their monitoring power is 
limited. However, they have influences on financial slack and leverage ratio. 
Contrary to the effect of controlling ownership, institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with financial slack and leverage ratio. 
5.2 Discussions 
While previous studies mainly draw agency theory to investigate the direct 
relationships between different types of ownership and R&D investments, this paper tried 
to find the different mechanisms about how different types of ownership influence R&D 
investments. Mainly based on agency theory, stewardship theory and financial theories 
such as pecking order theory, this paper predicted that different types of ownership may 
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not only affect R&D investments directly, but also influence it indirectly through 
financial structures such as leverage ratio and financial slack. 
Exploiting simultaneous equation modeling, my empirical study has showed that 
controlling ownership has direct positive effect on R&D intensity while institutional 
ownership has no influence. For the mediation effects, my empirical work showed: 
financial slack positively mediates the relationship between controlling ownership and 
R&D intensity but negatively mediates the relationship between institutional ownership 
and R&D intensity; while leverage ratio both positively mediates the relationship 
between controlling ownership and R&D intensity and the relationship between 
institutional ownership and R&D intensity. The whole effects of ownership structure on 
R&D investments are concluded in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
Consistent with previous studies, this paper found that controlling owners have 
impact on firms‟ strategic decisions. As La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessons et al. (2000) 
found, there is little separation between control and ownership among firms with 
controlling owners in developing countries all around the world. Since controlling owners 
both dominate the boards of directors and top management teams, it is reasonable that 
they have impact on firm‟s strategic decisions such as R&D investments. Drawing on 
agency theory and stewardship theory, this paper predicted that controlling ownership 
positively affect R&D intensity, which is also supported by the empirical study. 
Previous studies that have been done in the context of US showed the positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and R&D intensity. However, this paper 
didn‟t find the direct impact of institutional ownership. The different conclusions in   
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Figure 5. The model indicated by empirical study on the direct and indirect 
effects of controlling ownership on R&D investments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The model indicated by empirical study on the direct and indirect 
effects of institutional ownership on R&D investments. 
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different contexts can be explained by different corporate governance mechanisms and 
law environments. While shareholder protection laws in US and UK require public firms 
to publish more information and give shareholders more ways to monitor professional 
managers in these firms, shareholders‟ rights are limited in emerging markets. For 
example, in Korea, institutional investors were not allowed to exercise voting rights 
based on the “shadow voting” before 1997. Although there‟re some improvements after 
Korean government reform, Solomon et al. (2002) argued that the culturally embedded 
governance system is no easy to change, and doubted that institutional investors still may 
not play an active role in monitoring. What‟s more, unlike professional managers, 
controlling owners don‟t have job concerns and may not be enslaved to institutional 
investors. Thus, institutional investors don‟t have direct influence on R&D investments. 
Apart from different owners‟ direct impact on R&D investments, this paper 
argued that financial structures such as financial slack and leverage ratio might mediate 
the relationship between different types of ownership and R&D intensity. For example, 
since controlling owners have large influence on firms‟ behavior, it is straightforward 
that they affect firms‟ capital structure and financial slack; while institutional investors 
don‟t influence R&D investments directly, they may affect firms‟ dividend policy and 
capital structure. While controlling owners tend to maintain firms‟ control and care for 
long-term development, institutional investors only care for short-term return. Consistent 
with these perspectives, this paper showed that controlling ownership is positively 
associated with financial slack and but negatively associated with leverage ratio while 
institutional ownership is negatively associated with these financial factors.  
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There have been many empirical studies regarding the influences of these 
financial factors on R&D investments. Consistent with these studies, this paper found that 
financial slack positively affects R&D intensity while leverage ratio negatively affects it. 
Therefore, above findings indicate that financial factors such as financial slack and 
leverage ratio that were used to be considered as determinants of R&D investments are 
just mediators through which ownership structure affects firm‟s strategic decision 
indirectly. 
5.3 Limitations  
Above conclusions are reached based on an emerging economy, Korea. So these 
findings may not be generalized to other contexts. For example, whereas institutional 
investors are long-term oriented and promote R&D investments in United States (Hansen 
and Hill, 1991), I found that foreign and domestic institutional investors have no impact 
in Korea. One explanation for this difference is that controlling owners may not be 
enslaved to institutional investor‟ pressures in Korea but professional managers in US 
will do.  
My sample data only covers manufacturing industry, so above conclusions might 
also not be generalized to other industries. For instance, controlling owners are willing to 
invest in R&D activities may be only when these R&D activities are essential to their 
firms‟ survival and growth. R&D investments is especially important for manufacturing 
industry, but not for many other industries. So the different characteristics of different 
industries may influence different types of owners‟ orientations and preferences. 
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5.4 Implications 
Whereas prior studies treated financial factors such as financial slack and leverage 
ratio as important determinants of firm‟s R&D investments, this paper found that they are 
only some mediators through which ownership structure affects firm‟s strategy. 
Consistent with Williamson (1963)‟s view that ownership structure is the basis of 
corporate governance, ownership structure is the ultimate and most important factor that 
causes firm heterogeneity within an industry.  
In Korean context where legal protection of outsider investors is weak and rights 
of them are limited, to large extent firm‟s strategic decisions reflect its controlling owners‟ 
orientation and preferences. The specific governance environment in Korea endows 
controlling owners with strong power in determining firms‟ decisions. This governance 
setting might have some bad consequences. For example, controlling owners usually 
initiate projects that are good for themselves, no matter whether these activities would be 
detrimental to other shareholders; my study showed that they promote R&D investments 
but whether they overinvest in R&D activities is still not clear. Therefore, this study 
emphasizes the importance of improving the corporate governance mechanisms and 
environment in emerging markets, including improving legal protection of outside 
shareholders and debt holders, developing capital market and takeover market and so on. 
Only when corporate governance mechanisms and environment give balance the powers 
among all the stakeholders (i.e. controlling owners, institutional investors, minority 
shareholders, managers, debtholders) can impel controlling owners make appropriate 
strategic decisions. 
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APPENDIX A 
Delete observations where R&D intensity is above its mean three standard deviations 
                   Table 7. Panel Regression Results for equation (2) and equation (3) 
 Dependent variable:  
Financial slack (fs) 
Dependent variable:  
Leverage ratio (da) 
Independent variables Coef. Coef. 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.0208
* 
(.0092) 
-.0310
***
  
(.0077) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.0311
+ 
(.0168) 
-.0474
*** 
(.0133) 
Dividend ratio 
(divrt-1) 
.5638
***
  
(.1714) 
-1.4668
*** 
(.1445) 
Ln(total assets) 
(logtat-1) 
.0140
***
   
(.0019) 
.0069
*
  
(.0033) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
.3849
*** 
(.0152) 
-.1477
***
   
(.0122) 
Growth Opportunity 
(got-1) 
.0216
*** 
(.0051) 
.0235
***  
(.0040) 
_cons -.1315***  
(.0216) 
.6013
***
  
(.0348) 
Obs. 8237 8237 
Firm 982 982 
F Stat. 2.60***
 
12.33 
*** 
Hausman Stat. 228.98
***
 173.91
***
 
Model F.E. F.E. 
R-square 0.0803 0.3220 
 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%; 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
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Table 8. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
 Dependent variable:  
R&D intensity (rdint) 
Independent variables Coef. 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-1) 
.1308 
(.0878) 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-2) 
.0002 
(.0017) 
Leverage ratio  
(dat-1) 
-.0091
*** 
(.0032) 
Financial slack  
(fst-1) 
-.0007  
(.0027) 
Export ratio  
(exportrt-1) 
.0008 
(.0020) 
Firm size 
 (empt-1) 
-2.60e-07  
(5.20e-07) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
.0006  
(.0036) 
Growth Opportunity  
(got-1) 
.0015  
(.0012) 
Affilated 
(bgmember) 
.0012  
(.0015) 
Industry R&D intensity 
(indrdintt-1) 
.0002
 
(.0017) 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.0450
*
  
(.0178) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.0523  
(.0367) 
_cons .0175***  
(.0043) 
Obs. 5523 
Firm 878 
Wald stat. 83.97*** 
Sargan Stat. 463.01*** 
AR(1) -3.81*** 
AR(2) .287 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%. 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
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APPENDIX B 
Control for the effect of institutional change 
Table 9. Panel Regression Results for equation (2) and equation (3) 
 Dependent variable:  
Financial slack (fs) 
Dependent variable:  
Leverage ratio (da) 
Independent variables Coef. Coef. 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.0429
*** 
(.0122) 
-.0283
***
  
(.0085) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.0572
** 
(.0210) 
-.0268
+ 
(.0146) 
Dividend ratio 
(divrt-1) 
-.0202  
(.2156) 
-1.168
*** 
(.1503) 
Ln(total assets) 
(logtat-1) 
.0159
**
   
(.0051) 
.0052  
(.0036) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
.2938
*** 
(.0172) 
-.1263
***
   
(.0120) 
Growth Opportunity 
(got-1) 
.0226
*** 
(.0055) 
.0176
***  
(.0038) 
_cons -.1038+  
(.0541) 
.4912
***
  
(.0377) 
Obs. 7539 7539 
Firm 991 991 
F Stat. 2.60***
 
12.50
*** 
Hausman Stat. 47.96
***
 173.91
***
 
Model F.E. F.E. 
R-square 0.0824 0.1155 
 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%; 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
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Table 10. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
 Dependent variable:  
R&D intensity (rdint) 
Independent variables Coef. 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-1) 
.4928
*** 
(.0301) 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-2) 
-.0327
+ 
(.0173) 
Leverage ratio  
(dat-1) 
-.0270
*** 
(.0055) 
Financial slack  
(fst-1) 
.0080
* 
(.0048) 
Export ratio  
(exportrt-1) 
-.0039  
(.0042) 
Firm size 
 (empt-1) 
-1.26e-06  
(9.50e-07) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
-.00002  
(.0050) 
Growth Opportunity  
(got-1) 
.0135
***
  
(.0016) 
Affilated 
(bgmember) 
.0035  
(.0091) 
Industry R&D intensity 
(indrdintt-1) 
-.0134
*** 
(.0037) 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.1553
*
   
(.0659) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.1628  
(.1344) 
_cons .0088 
(.0068) 
Obs. 4659 
Firm 900 
Wald stat. 385.87*** 
Sargan Stat. 247.36*** 
AR(1) -5.16*** 
AR(2) 1.14 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%. 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
  
68 
 
APPENDIX C 
Different measure of firm size 
Table 11. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
 Dependent variable:  
R&D intensity (rdint) 
Independent variables Coef. 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-1) 
.4124
***
  
(.0254) 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-2) 
-.0458
**
  
(.0153) 
Leverage ratio  
(dat-1) 
-.0198
** 
(.0067) 
Financial slack  
(fst-1) 
.0059
+
  
(.0037) 
Export ratio  
(exportrt-1) 
-.0060
+
  
(.0034) 
Firm size 
 (logtat-1) 
-.0068  
(.0052) 
ROA 
 (roat-1) 
.0062  
(.0068) 
Growth Opportunity  
(got-1) 
.0120
***
  
(.0013) 
Affilated 
(bgmember) 
.0022  
(.0065) 
Industry R&D intensity 
(indrdintt-1) 
-.0075
**
    
(.0028) 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.1268
**
   
(.0451) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
.0561  
(.1013) 
_cons .0807+  
(.0436) 
Obs. 5740 
Firm 901 
Wald stat. 438.52*** 
Sargan Stat. 487.13*** 
AR(1) -5.457*** 
AR(2) 1.00 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%. 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
  
69 
 
APPENDIX D 
Drop insignificant control variables 
Table 12. Two-Stage estimation and Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
 Dependent variable:  
R&D intensity (rdint) 
Independent variables Coef. 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-1) 
.3963
*** 
(.0199) 
R&D intensity  
(rdintt-2) 
-.0182 
(.0125) 
Leverage ratio  
(dat-1) 
-.0267
*** 
(.0038) 
Financial slack  
(fst-1) 
.0064
* 
(.0031) 
Export ratio  
(exportrt-1) 
-.0062
* 
(.0028) 
Growth Opportunity  
(got-1) 
.0100
*** 
(.0011) 
Industry R&D intensity 
(indrdintt-1) 
-.0072
** 
(.0025) 
Controlling ownership 
(owner_pt-1) 
.0616
*
   
(.0296) 
Institutional ownership 
(inst_pt-1) 
-.0101  
(.0581) 
_cons .0279  
(.0048) 
Obs. 7072 
Firm 960 
Wald stat. 566.19*** 
Sargan Stat. 458.20*** 
AR(1) -6.38*** 
AR(2) .854 
1. The figures in the parentless are the standard deviations for the coefficients； 
2. *** indicates the significance level at 0.1%，** indicates the significance level at 1%，* indicates the significance 
level at 5%，+ indicates the significance level at 10%. 
3. Year dummies are controlled for above models but not reported in this table. 
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